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Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the procedures for the
confirmation of a reorganization plan. Section 1129(a) includes the criteria
for the most frequently used method of confirmation-that of settlement by
the debtor, creditors, and equity holders. Such settlement often involves
gaining unanimous consent of all of the parties. However, in the absence of
unanimity within any class, the best interest of creditors test under section
1129(a)(7) protects dissenting members of a consenting class by setting forth
standards that a plan must meet in regard to their claims if the plan is to be
confirmed.
Section 1129(b) sets forth an alternative method of confirmation called
the "cramdown," which is often written about and discussed but which has
occurred in relatively few cases since the Code has been in effect. The cram-
down option permits the confirmation of a plan notwithstanding the failure
of one or more classes of impaired claims or interests to accept the plan
under section 1129(a)(8). With the exception of section 1129(a)(8), all of the
other conditions specified in section 1129(a) must be met for the confirma-
tion of the cramdown of a plan under section 1129(b). The cramdown is one
of the new provisions included in the Code to facilitate the confirmation of a
plan in the face of opposition by one or more classes. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, most commentators view the inclusion of the cramdown provisions
as favoring settlement, since the complexity and risks involved in a cram-
down should encourage compromise and bargaining among the debtor,
creditors, and equity holders.' For instance, Richard F. Broude claims:
the risks of failure to reach settlement are so great, and the
possible negative impact of the imposition of the cramdown
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powers so significant, that the cramdown power is used
more as a threat than as a club actually employed in con-
firming a plan of reorganization. Further, in an arena where
timing is often more important than the ideal result, the
delay caused by invocation of the cramdown power is likely
to result in harm to all. 2
This article will discuss the cramdown on secured creditors under sec-
tions 1129(b)(1) and (2)(A). However, an understanding of the cramdown
on secured creditors is at times inextricably linked to an understanding of
the cramdown on unsecured creditors and equity holders. At those times,
especially in discussion of the case law history and legislative background of
the cramdown, there will be frequent reference to cases that involve the
cramdown on unsecured creditors.
The first part of this article will be devoted to discussion of the history
of the cramdown, tracing the development of the pre-Code case law and
pointing out issues of particular interest to the cramdown on secured
creditors under the Code. Next, the statutory development preceding the
Code and the legislative debate and history of the Code itself will be con-
sidered.
In part II consideration is given to the cramdown provisions in sections
1129(b)(1) and (2)(A) and some of the related provisions, such as sections
1124, 1126(f), and 1111(b). Included is discussion of some of the confusion
inherent in the cramdown provisions themselves and other ambiguities
caused by the interaction of the cramdown provisions with these other pro-
visions, some of which were remedied by the 1984 Amendments to the
Code. Cramdown is examined from various perspectives -from that of the
drafters, to suggest what the provisions were envisioned to do; from that of
the debtor and the secured creditors, to ascertain what alternatives they
have and what decisions they must make in respect to the cramdown; and
from that of the practitioner who wants to learn what forms have to be filed,
after certain decisions have been.made.
Part III will consider the valuation problems that are involved in a cram-
down on secured creditors. The many risks involved in valuation demon-
strate why it is most advantageous for the debtor and secured creditors to
negotiate and try their best to reach a settlement under section 1129(a)
rather than to seek a cramdown under section 1129(b).
The Addendum to this article includes a fact situation and related prob-
lems. The problems are meant to elucidate the valuation risks that arise in a
cramdown. They also offer an opportunity to see how the standards con-
tained in section 1129(b)(2)(A) function in practice, as well as demonstrate
2Broude, supra note 1, at 441.
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that the cramdown process does not involve the application of clear-cut,
scientific principles. Finally, the problems offer another perspective as to
why the cramdown provisions loom as a threat and lead parties to reach set-
tlement.
PART I.
A. PRE-CODE CASE LAW
Section 1129(b) of the Code should not be read in isolation. Rather, it is
the culmination of decades of gradually evolving conceptions about the rela-
tionship between creditors and debtors, the best way for creditors to pro-
tect themselves in the face of debtor insolvency, and the criteria required for
confirming a reorganization plan (or historically, its equivalent). Through an
analysis of the major cases decided over the past three-quarters of a century,
most of which concern unsecured creditors, but which are important for
learning about the treatment of secured creditors, an attempt is made to
show how the cramdown principles evolved. The second half of part I
discusses the reactions that the drafters of the Code had toward this case
law, as demonstrated by the provisions they included in section 1129.
Section 1129(b)(1) requires that to be confirmed, a plan must be "fair
and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is im-
paired under, and has not accepted, the plan." Section 1129(b)(2)(A) goes
on to specify certain standards to be used for ascertaining whether a given
plan is "fair and equitable" with respect to a class of secured claims. This
phrase, "fair and equitable," has a long and richly litigated history closely
tied to that of the "fixed principle," and the "absolute priority rule." Yet,
confusion exists about the origination of the "fair and equitable" phrase:
It is not easy to trace the history of the 'fair and equitable'
phrase. The Court [in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co.]3 cites railroad receivership cases as authority for the
meaning of the phrase. Although none of the cited cases
used the exact phrase, the Court concluded that 'the phrase
became a term of art used to indicate that a plan of
reorganization fulfilled the necessary standards of fairness.' 4
It is helpful to trace the development of the principles that led to the
"fair and equitable" standards. Many commentators point to the Supreme
Court's decision in Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Boyd 5 as heralding
the arrival of the "fixed principle" for judging the adequacy of reorganization
3308 U.S. 106 (1939).
4Coogan, supra note 1, n.57 at 313, citing id. at 118.
S228 U.S. 482 (1913).
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plans.6 Vern Countryman, however, has shown that the "fixed principle" of
Boyd was foreshadowed in two earlier Supreme Court cases, Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Howard7 and Louisville Trust Co. v.
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. 8 (the Monon case). 9 In Howard:
An agreement was made between the mortgage bond-
holders and the stockholders that the railroad properties
should be sold for $5,500,000 of which 16% was to be paid
to the stockholders and the balance to the bondholders,
with no provision for the unsecured holders of the
[raillroad's guarantees on the municipal bonds.1
The Court held that such an arrangement was void because the stockholders
had been paid their 16% before the unsecured creditors had been paid
anything. In effect the Court resorted to the old trust fund theory, which
holds that in liquidation the order of priority puts the unsecured creditors
ahead of the stockholders, but behind the junior and senior secured
creditors. Under this theory, when the secured creditors agreed to take
84%, they discharged the rest of their claims, so that the remaining 16%
belonged to the corporation and should have been used to pay off the
unsecured creditors and not the shareholders. If the secured creditors had
taken 100%, the unsecured creditors would have had no valid claim to any
of the fund, since under the Court's theory, unless the secured creditors
agree otherwise, they must get paid in full before any other class of creditors
or shareholders shares in the fund.II In Howard, the Court thus sets a foun-
dation for both the "fixed principle" and the "absolute priority rule."
The Monon case involved another scenario in which the secured bond-
holders and shareholders entered into an advance agreement to the detri-
ment of the unsecured creditors whom they ignored. In this case the Court
articulated the beginnings of what came to be called the "fixed principle":
"the stockholders' interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of
creditors. [Any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights
and interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense
of the prior rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial denuncia-
tion."12 The decision implied that priority must be absolute, unless the
secured and unsecured creditors agree otherwise. In the absence of such an
6See V. Countryman, Corporate Reorganization Seminar Manuscript at 19ff (Spring 1984) (un-
published manuscript); 5 COLLIR ON BANKRUPTCY 11129.03[2], (15th ed. 1985).
774 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392 (1869).
8174 U.S. 674 (1899).
9Countryman, supra note 6, at 21.
'Old. at 19.
"74 U.S. at 409-410, 414.
12174 U.S. at 684.
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agreement, a foreclosure cannot preserve anything for shareholders until
secured creditors, and then unsecured creditors, are paid in full.
It was in Boyd that the Court named the "fixed principle" and expanded
the Court's supervisory function in determining whether any given agree-
ment complied with the "fixed principle." Here again, as in Howard and
Monon, the plan put forward allowed the secured creditors and
shareholders to share in payments before the unsecured creditors had
received anything. The Court held that the unsecured creditors must be
paid before shareholders: "For, if purposely or unintentionally a single
creditor was not paid, or provided for in the reorganization, he could assert
his superior rights against the subordinate interests of the old stockholders
in the property transferred to the new company."13
Although the Court ruled that unsecured creditors must be paid off in
full before the shareholders may receive a cent, it did not hold that they had
to be paid off with one lump cash payment as part of a reorganization plan.
The Court claimed that paying off the unsecured creditors first: "does
not... require the impossible and make it necessary to pay an unsecured
creditor in cash as a condition of shareholders retaining an interest in the
reorganized company. His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on
equitable terms, of income bonds or preferred stock."14 This principle that a
plan need not require the impossible has been carried over into the Code in
section 1129(a) settlements and section 1129(b) cramdowns and is closely
linked to the section 1129 (a)(11) requirement that a plan must be feasible.
Under section 1129(b)(2)(A) dissenting classes of secured creditors must be
paid off with either a cash stream, secured debt securities, or the "in-
dubitable equivalent" although Countryman contends that dissenting
classes of secured creditors also may be compelled to accept equity securities
under the "indubitable equivalent" standard of section 1129(b)(2)(A) (iii). If
Countryman is correct, then in those situations where classes of secured
creditors are paid with stock, the court must value both the securities and
the going enterprise if any other class dissents in respect to the plan.
Although the "fixed principle" was more or less accepted as the law in
1913, consensus did not exist as to whether the "fixed principle" mandated
application of the "absolute priority rule"'5 (a term originated in 1928 by
James Bonbright and Milton Bergerman in their article, Two Rival Theories of
Priority Rights of Security Holders in Corporate Reorganizations' 6) or the
"relative priority rule."'7 Although the "absolute priority" rule was accepted
13228 U.S. at 504.
4Id. at 508.
1-5 CorumR ON BA~mupyrcy, supra note 6, 1129.03[2), n.10.
1628 CoLuM. L. Rzy. 127 (1928).
17Countryman, supra note 6, at 43-44.
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by many courts, some courts utilized the alternative "relative priority"
rule. i8
In Case and again two years later in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v.
DuBois,19 the Supreme Court upheld the rule of "absolute priority." The rule
as interpreted in earlier cases had been that in the absence of an agreement
between the classes of secured creditors and classes of unsecured creditors,
all senior secured creditors had to be paid off in full before junior secured
creditors could be paid anything, junior secured creditors before unsecured
creditors, and unsecured creditors before shareholders. In Case, in contrast
the Court interpreted the "absolute priority" rule more strictly as meaning
just what it says-as one commentator puts it, "Approval of the statutory
two-thirds of the class [in amount and number] did not excuse the judge
from making a fair and equitable finding."20 Another commentator agrees:
This was an absolute rule and, if strictly adhered to by a
court considering a plan of reorganization, would have for-
bidden creditors and other parties in interest in a [Clhapter
X case from making accommodations among themselves in
order to be able to confirm a plan in timely fashion and with
fewer legal and other expenses that might otherwise be in-
curred.21
This strict vision of the "absolute priority" principle decided under both sec-
tion 77B (the predecessor provision of Chapter X) and also under Chapter X
continues in the cramdown provisions of section 1129(b) relating to the "fair
and equitable" standards, but only as applied to the dissenting class or
classes.
In earlier cases the courts had used the "fixed principle" and "absolute
priority" rule to set the foundation for what came to be known in Case as the
"fair and equitable" doctrine. In Case and DuBois, the Court then tried to
define better what these "fair and equitable" requirements meant. Much as
the Boyd court linked the "fixed principle" to a feasibility requirement in
respect to the issuing of securities by a reorganizing debtor, the DuBois court
linked the "fair and equitable" standards to a feasibility requirement in
respect to an enterprise valuation of the reorganizing debtor. The DuBois
court set out a procedure for valuing the enterprise which involved capitaliz-
ing prospective earnings. Once arriving at this figure, the court then decided
18 See Bonbright and Bergerman, supra note 16; id.; Countryman, at 44-46. Bonbright and Bergerman
argue in favor of the "relative priority" rule.
-9312 U.S. 510 (1941).
2Coogan, supra note 1, at 312; See 5. CoLLIER oN BANaup'rcy, supra note 6, 1129.0312].
2'Broude, supra note 1, at 442.
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whether it satisfied the "fair and equitable" and feasibility requirements. 22
To put it in the Court's own words:
Findings as to the earning capacity of an enterprise are
essential to a determination of the feasibility as well as the
fairness of a plan of reorganization. Whether or not the
earnings may reasonably be expected to meet the interest
and dividend requirements of the new securities is a sine
qua non to a determination of the integrity and practicabili-
ty of the new capital structure. It is also essential for
satisfaction of the absolute priority rule of Case... 23
Peter Coogan has described the Court's valuation process in simpler terms,
as a two-step procedure: After deciding on an estimated probable yearly
earnings value, this "estimate was then multiplied by a suitable times earn-
ings multiple to produce an entity valuation."24 Part III contains a discussion
of this valuation procedure in greater detail, but it should appear evident by
now that such a procedure is far from scientifically exact. Though Coogan
believes that this DuBois evaluation process involves a "guess compounded
by an estimate,"25 and some "crystal ball gazing," 26 he still believes that
abstractly it "may have been and still is the best method available."27
Two years after DuBois, in Ecker v. Great Western Railroad Co.,2s the
Supreme Court approved an alternative method of enterprise valuation that
had been used by the Interstate Commerce Commission in railroad
reorganizations. 29 In Ecker the Court again decided on an estimated probable
yearly earnings value but did not capitalize it, i.e., did not multiply it by a
times earning multiple. Rather, it "directly compared the available estimated
earnings against the interest or dividend requirements of the securities to be
issued."30 Again, it is a matter of debate whether in a cramdown under sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A), a class of secured creditors may be compelled to accept
equity securities. Ecker is mentioned here to demonstrate that there are
alternative procedures for ascertaining the enterprise value of a corporation
under section 1129(b) for purposes of determining the feasibility of a plan.
It is also important to notice that in both DuBois and Ecker, the enter-
225 CaOrmt ON BA2mupTcY, supra note 6, 1129.03[21.
23312 U.S. at 525.
2Coogan, supra note 1, at 313.
23Id., a't 313, n.62 citing Coogan's remark in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 222 (1977).
26Coogan, supra note 1, at 313.
271d.
-318 U.S. 448 (1943).
29Coogan, supra note 1, at 354.
3oId.
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prise was valued on the basis of a going concern rather than a liquidation
value. The going concern approach:
was justified by the fact that the very purpose of a
reorganization proceeding is to avoid a forced sale of assets
and to preserve the going concern value of the business by
continuing its operations. It is incongruous to value a
business that is being reorganized on the basis of the price
its assets could fetch on a piecemeal liquidation when the
entire theory of the reorganization is that the debtor is be-
ing preserved as a going concern. 3'
This going concern approach continues in the Code, both as to enterprise
valuation and the valuation of secured creditors' collateral under section
1129(b)(2)(A).
Another issue raised by DuBois and Ecker is whether the securities to be
issued as part of a reorganization plan must have a par value or an actual
market value equal to the value of a claim. "Under neither test, was there
any pretense that the then market value of the new securities would equal
the amount of the old claim replaced."32 Other cases, however, have held to
the contrary: "Occasional commentators and even less occasional decisions
suggested that full satisfaction under the absolute priority rule should re-
quire payment in immediate cash equivalents, not merely in securities hav-
ing a face amount which equals the cash claim." 33 DuBois and Ecker,
however, support: "The prevailing view [which] seems to have been that
the 'full satisfaction' was given if the surrendering senior security holders
'receive, for their total claim, a par amount of the claims for which they are
exchanged.' 34 Notice that the stricter view, requiring immediate cash
equivalents, might well make it difficult to confirm some cramdown plans by
making the plans infeasible. Under section 1129(b)(2)(A), this debate about
the proper value of securities will only occur if Countryman's view is ac-
cepted and classes of secured creditors may be compelled to accept equity
securities as the "indubitable equivalent."
A final issue in pre-Code case law that affects the cramdown and
deserves mention is the relationship between a secured creditor's right to
protection of his collateral (and thus his debt) and a debtor's right to protec-
tion from his creditors when he files for reorganization. The major pre-Code
3"Pachulski, supra note 1, at 939.
32Coogan, supra note 1, at 354.
33V. BRUDNEY & M. CHInRLSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FnANCE at 136 (2d ed.
1979).
341d. at 137, citing Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, 290 I.C.C. 477, 555 (1954), plan approved
129 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Mo. 1955), aff'd 225 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 959 (1956).
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case on point is In re Prudence.35 In that case, when the value of the col-
lateral became substantially less than the value of the debt it secured, the
secured creditor sought to vacate the injunction against lien enforcement.
The trustee responded that foreclosure would affect the prospects of the
proposed reorganization plan. The court responded:
Even if that were so, the enforcement of a secured creditor's
rights may not be unreasonably and indefinitely postponed.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Henwood, 867 (F.2d)
347 (C.C.A.8). Moreover, it is not adequately shown that
the withdrawal of the collateral will materially affect the
prospects, if any, of a successful plan. In granting the ap-
pellant [secured creditor] the relief sought, nothing is taken
out of the estate in which other creditors have an interest
and their attitude toward the plan would be unaffected
thereby.36
This case involves adequate protection issues similar to those that arise
under sections 361 and 362(d). The importance of Prudence for our needs is
the issues it raises about: (1) the relationship between valuations for the
purpose of determining adequate protection under sections 361 and 362 and
valuations for the purpose of determining "fair and equitable" treatment
under section 1129(b)(2)(A); and (2) the relationship between the "in-
dubitable equivalent" clause in section 361(3) and the same clause in section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
B. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1938 in the Chandler Act, Congress added Chapters X, X, and XII
to the Bankruptcy Act. Chapter X superseded old section 77B of the Act.
As mentioned earlier Chapter X:
was interpreted, although perhaps not so designed, as
precluding settlement by the creditors and equity holders
involved in the case. This resulted from the judicial gloss
imposed by the Supreme Court on the Chapter X require,
ment that a plan of reorganization, to be confirmed, had to
be fair and equitable. 37
This interpretation was given to an early form of the cramdown in section
216(7) of Chapter X, which permitted confirmation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion notwithstanding the opposition of a class of creditors, so long as the
390 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1937), discussed in 5 CoLiER oN BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, 1129.03[2].
365 Cotwa. oN BANrRuPTcy, supra note 6, 1129.03[2], citing 90 F.2d at 589.
37Broude, supra note 1, at 441.
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dissenting classes were given certain adequate protection for the realization
by them of the value of their claims against the property dealt with by the
plan. 38 These forms of protection are the predecessors of what are now pro-
vided in the "fair and equitable" criteria of section 1129(b)(2)(A). Following
is a list of these earlier forms of protection in section 216(7), with references
to the Code provisions by which they were superseded:
(a) by the transfer or sale, or by the retention by the debt,
or, of such property subject to such claims. [super-
seded by section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)];
(b) by a sale of such property free of such claims, at not
less than a fair upset price, and the transfer to such
claims to the proceeds of such sale. [superseded by
section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)];
(c) by appraisal and payment in cash of the value of such
claims. [superseded by section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)
which allows deferred cash payments].
(d) by such method as will, under and consistent with the
circumstances of the particular case, equitably and
fairly provide such protection. [superseded by section
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)].
In comparison with Chapter X, Chapter XI contained no cramdown pro-
cedure and in 1952 its "fair and equitable" standard was deleted) The aim
of Chapter XI was to encourage the parties to reach a settlement. Except for
arguments by analogy, Chapter XI is outside the scope of a discussion of
secured creditors' rights, since it was used solely for reorganizing unsecured
debt.
In the mid-1970's Congress began to debate and redraft the bankruptcy
laws. The result was the Bankruptcy Code of 1979. Much of the Congres-
sional debate revolved around the "fair and equitable" standards which had
been cast in the form of the "absolute priority rule": "Early in the process,
most of the knowledgeable commentators on bankruptcy concluded that, if
not abandoned completely, the absolute priority rule should be modified in
major respects. The importance of deal-making in the reorganization process
was recognized."40 "The result of this common-sense approach" in the Code
is that the confirmation standards contained in section 1129(a) abandon the
"fair and equitable" requirements 41 and allow for consensual settlement to
385 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, 11129.03[2].
39Broude, supra note 1, at 442-43.
401d. at 443.
411d.
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achieve a plan, either through unanimity, or if that is not possible, through
protection of the dissenting members within a class under section
1129(a)(7). Section 1129(b), however, builds on the evolving "fair and
equitable" principles in cases such as Howard, Monon, Boyd, Case, and
DuBois in that it retains a "fair and equitable" doctrine which is independent
of the parties' settlement. There is one important difference, however, for as
the Comment in the Collier Pamphlet Edition states:
The 'fair and equitable' rule applies only with respect to a
dissenting class, thus representing a marked difference from
the application of the rule in Chapter X cases under the
Act... [in which] a plan was not fair and equitable unless
each class in descending order first received full compensa-
tion for its claims or interests.42
Section 1129(b) is thus a modified carryover of the "absolute priority" rule.
Though impossible under Chapter X of the Act, under the Code:
senior accepting creditors may give up value to junior
classes provided no dissenting intervening class receives
less than the full amount of its claims. If no such dissenting
intervening class exists, and the only dissent is from a class
junior to the class which has given up value then the plan
may still be fair and equitable with respect to the dissenting
class provided no senior class has received more than 100
percent of its claims. 43
In respect to the "absolute priority" rule, section 1129(a) harks back to
Chapter XI and section 1129(b) to Chapter X.
What was Congress attempting to do with section 1129(b)? The House
Report states, "This subsection contains the so-called cramdown. It requires
simply that the plan meet certain standards of fairness to dissenting
creditors or equity security holders." 44 In respect to secured creditors,
though the "absolute priority" principle is applicable, the "treatment of
classes of secured creditors is slightly different because they do not fall in
the priority ladder."4 This statement deserves an explanation. First of all,
secured creditors are classified according to the collateral that secures their
debt. Next, within any group of secured creditors who hold security in-
terests in the same piece of collateral, further classification is usually done
42Comwrent to section 1129, in CoLLER PAMPHLET EDITION, PART 3, THE BANKR. CODE (1981). See
124 CONG. REc. H. 11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,420 (Oct. 6, 1978).
13Id.; See H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 413, which adds that if a dissenting, impaired class is "paid less
than in full, then no class junior may receive anything under the plan."
41H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 413.
451d
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according to the rank of the security interests. "Secured creditors who hold
liens on different items of property, or who hold liens of a different rank on
the same property, should be separately classified." 46 Therefore, in most in-
stances each secured creditor will end up in a class by himself.47 Exceptions
do occur, however, because when two or more secured creditors hold liens
of equal rank on the same property of the estate, they should be included in
the same class. Examples of this include:
(1) Claims of holders of equipment trust certificates issued
by a debtor and secured by a lien on equipment in
favor of a trustee acting on behalf of the certificate
holders.
(2) Secured mortgage bonds issued under an indenture
pursuant to the terms of which the indenture trustee
hold a lien on property of the debtor to secure the
bonds.48
This different character of secured claims partially accounts for the dif-
ferent treatment that they receive under section 1129(b)(2)(A). The main
reason for the different treatment, however, is not so much that there may
be fewer, smaller classes of secured creditors, but that all secured creditors,
with regard to their collateral, come ahead of unsecured creditors.
This pre-Code case law and legislative history of the issues related to
the cramdown on secured creditors sets the background for an analysis of
the provisions for the cramdown on secured creditors, which are discussed
in part II.
PART II.
A. THE CODE PROVISIONS FOR THE CRAMDOWN ON SECURED CREDITORS
(b)(1) Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of
the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section
other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the
court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm
the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such para-
graph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair
and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or in-
terests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan.
46Pachulski, supra note 1, at 929.
475 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, 1129.0314][b]; 6 COLLIER BANKR. PRACTICE GuIDE,
91.03 (1985).
485 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, 1129.0314][b].
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(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that
a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class in-
cludes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan
provides-
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens
securing such claims, whether the property subject
to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred
to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive
on account of such claim deferred cash payments
totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim,
of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at
least the value of such holder's interest in the
estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this ti-
tle, of any property that is subject to the liens
securing such claims, free and clear of such liens,
with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such
sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds
under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the in-
dubitable equivalent of such claims.
B. SECTION 1129(b)(1)
This section includes the alternative confirmation procedure known as
the cramdown, by which "a plan may be confirmed, notwithstanding the
failure of an impaired class to accept the plan under section 1129(a)(8),"49 as
long as all of the other criteria of section 1129(a) have been met. The cram-
down may only be invoked with respect to each class of claims or interests
that is impaired under and has not accepted the plan. Section 1124 sets forth
the criteria for impairment of claims. Under section 1126(f), a class that is
not impaired is conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan. Under sec-
tion 1126(c), a class of claims accepts a plan if holders of at least two-thirds
in amount and more than one-half in number have accepted the plan.
49124 CONG. REc. H. 11,103 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,420 (Oct. 6, 1978).
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The cramdown in section 1129(b)(1) may only be requested by the pro-
ponent of the plan.50 The proponent of the plan also has the burden of proof
to demonstrate that the plan complies with the "fair and equitable" re-
quirements in section 1129(b)(2)(A).5 1 Usually, if a trustee has not been ap-
pointed, during the first 120 days after the date the order for relief is
entered, only the debtor may file a plan and thus be able to invoke cram-
down, in accordance with section 1121. After the 120 days have run, or 180
days to allow for solicitation of acceptances, and the debtor's exclusivity
period is not extended, any party in interest that proposes a plan may re-
quest the use of the cramdown.
The court may not amend the plan, but rather must merely decide
whether the plan is "fair and equitable" and complies with the requirements
of sections 1129(a) and (b).52 In the event that several plans satisfy these re-
quirements, the court may only confirm one plan, in compliance with section
1129(c). The court has more power than at first may appear evident, for as
the Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide (CBPG) points out:
as observed in the Landmark"3 case, once the Court has
delineated the respect in which the fair and equitable test is
not met, the effect is to suggest what plan would be accept-
able and accordingly 'the plan could be readily modified.'
Thus, the class of secured claims must be prepared for an at-
tempt by the debtor, if it is feasible, to modify the plan to
cure the deficiency.54
As section 1129(b)(1) specifies, the court must determine whether a
plan discriminates unfairly, and is "fair and equitable" in respect to a dissi-
dent class or classes. Section 1129(b)(2)(A) sets forth criteria for determin-
ing whether a plan is "fair and equitable," but the court is offered no other
guidance for determining whether a plan discriminates unfairly. The Con-
gressional Record states that, 'The requirement of the House bill that a plan
not 'discriminate unfairly' with respect to a class is included for clarity.""
Clarity about what? CBPG suggests that this requirement, "is essentially
designed to provide equal treatment to classes of the same rank and
character with a special view to multiple classes of unsecured claims in-
cluding a class of unsecured subordinated claims."56 Is this provision ap-
plicable to secured claims?
50124 CONG. Rec. H. 11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,420 (Oct. 6, 1978); H.R. REP., supra note 25, at
414.
516 COLLIER BANKR. PRACTICE GuIDE, supra note 47, 191.07(3].
'2H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 414.
"In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1312 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
'16 COLLIER BANKR. PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 47, 191.0713].
"124 CONG. Rec. H. 11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,420 (October 6, 1978).
166 COLLIER BANKR. PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 47, 91.05, referring to H.R. REP., supra note 25, at
416-17.
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Although it might be argued that different treatment to
a class of claims secured by real estate as contrasted, for
example, with a class secured by equipment, constitutes un-
fair discrimination, it does not appear that this is the evil
which the unfair discrimination provision was designed to
prevent. These two classes would not be considered of the
same character, and the different nature of the collateral
should be sufficient to justify any rational distinction in
treatment.57
In other words, the discrimination will rarely, if ever, be applicable to
classes of secured creditors, because they do not fall on the priority ladder as
classes of unsecured claims do. Countryman offers a contrary view,
however, and argues that after section 506(a) is applied, all secured claims
should be treated the same to the extent that they are properly secured.
The 1984 Amendments to the Code remedied some of the confusion
resulting from the interplay of certain sections of the Code with the cram-
down provisions. For instance, prior to the 1984 Amendments, the interac-
tion of sections 1124 and 1126 with section 1129(b), as Coogan points out,
might well have caused difficulties for certain classes of secured claims. He
asks, "Can a plan proponent who has persuaded a majority of each class, ex-
cept one, force that class to take some treatment which it does not vote to
accept and still operate under section 1129(a)(8) rather than under the cram-
down of section 1129(b)?"58
Recall that the cramdown may only be imposed on dissenting classes
that are impaired under section 1124. Coogan realizes that a proponent of a
plan might well have been aware of both the complexity and risks involved
in a cramdown and might well have tried try to use the confirmation stan-
dards of section 1129(a)(8) by forcing a class of secured creditors (which is
often composed of only one creditor) into one of the three subsections
specified in section 1124 as a means of preventing that class from objecting.39
Such a strategy by the debtor might only have worked because section
1126(f) held that an unimpaired class was "deemed to have accepted the
plan."
For instance, consider the following situation: A debtor is in default and
a secured creditor, the holder of the first mortgage, begins to foreclose.
When the debtor files under chapter 11, foreclosure proceedings are stayed
under section 362. The debtor proposes a plan of reorganization that will
$76 COLLER BANCR. PRACTICE Gumn, supra note 47, 91.05.
'ECoogan, supra note 1, at 351.
59d. at 336.
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cure all defaults including paying all interest and reinstating the first mort-
gage. The unsecured creditors accept the plan, as well as another secured
creditor, the holder of a second mortgage who is impaired under the plan.
The holder of the first mortgage rejects the plan since it believes that it
would be better treated as a rejecting class under a section 1129(b)(2)(A)
cramdown. The debtor argues that the plan complies with the requirements
of section 1124, so that the holder of the first mortgage is no longer impaired
under the plan. In response, the holder of the first mortgage argues that it is
"impaired economically and legally in not being able to call in a low interest
debt and reinvest at twice the old rate."60 The holder of the first mortgage
wants to accelerate the mortgage rather than having it reinstated, so it can
pay off the holder of the second mortgage and take over the building for
itself. The debtor, in turn, responds that the holder of the first mortgage is
not impaired merely by losing the right to accelerate and call in the debt.
In this example prior to the 1984 Amendments the "deemed to accept"
language of section 1126(0 directly conflicted with the actual rejection by
the holder of the first mortgage. What result? As Coogan points out, in In re
Marston Enterprises, Inc.,61 the court claimed that the actual rejection con-
trols and not the "deemed acceptance" of section 1126(0.62 'The court read
'deemed' to mean basically the same as 'presumed,'" and held that such "a
presumption can be rebutted by the actual facts."63 Although other courts
had followed Marston,64 the legislative response in the 1984 Amendments
overruled Marston and its followers. An unimpaired class no longer is
"deemed to have accepted the plan." Rather, it is "conclusively presumed to
have accepted the plan" and such presumption is not rebuttable by the ac-
tual facts. This new result is sensible because even prior to the 1984
Amendments in cases such as Marston, or our hypothetical, even though a
class of secured creditors forced the debtor to seek the use of the cramdown,
the court could have concluded that the plan was "fair and equitable" with
respect to the class, realizing that the rejection of the plan by the secured
creditors was most likely part of an attempt to renegotiate the original trans-
action, delay the reorganization, and compel the debtor to offer higher
payments or better terms as part of settlement.
Another controversy involving the cramdown on secured creditors that
was resolved by the 1984 Amendments is the relationship between section
601d. at 337-38.
617 BANKI. CT. Dac. (CRR) 1403, discussed in id. at 339-40.
62Coogan, supra note 2, at 339-40.
631d. at 340. See 7 BANKR. CT. Dac. (CRR) at 1407 where the court states, "the presumption of ac-
ceptance under § 1126(f) is rebuttable while the presumption of rejection under § 1126(g) is conclusive."
(emphasis in original) and "To deem that a party has accepted a plan when the fact is that it has rejected
the plan, is Alice in Wonderland reasoning which this court cannot accept."
64See In re Barnngton Oaks General Partnership, 15 Bankr. 952 (D. Utah 1981); In re Spirited, Inc.,
23 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
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1129(b) and section 1129(a)(10). Prior to the 1984 Amendments section
1129(a)(10) held that for a plan to be confirmed, at least one class of claims
had accepted the plan. There was some controversy about whether, to be
confirmed, a plan had to be accepted by a voting class or whether the
"deemed to accept" language of section 1126(f) sufficed. 65 As Broude points
out:
Assume a plan contains one class of secured creditors, two
classes of unsecured creditors, and one class of interests.
The unsecured classes and old equity are unimpaired but
the secured class, which is impaired, votes against the plan.
The question arises as to whether the provisions of section
1129(a)(10) have been satisfied in light of section
1126(0... Has at least one class of claims accepted the
plan, or is it necessary that there be a class of claims that ac-
tually has voted in favor of the plan?66
Some commentators such as Broude had persuasively argued that an actual
accepting class should be required, "in light of the philosophy underlying
chapter 11, which is to force a deal and to avoid cramdown."67 He further
argues that if no actual voting class is required and the debtor refuses to set-
tle and prefers cramdown, then it is likely that the "plan will fall apart,
resulting in a liquidation."68 Marston also held that "one class of impaired
claims must actively accept the plan." 69 Section 1129(a)(10) as amended by
the 1984 Amendments now reads, "If a class of claims is impaired under the
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted
the plan." (emphasis added) With the inclusion of the word "impaired" in
section 1129(a)(10), the "conclusively presumed" acceptance of an unim-
paired class under section 1126(f) will not suffice for purposes of section
1129(a)(10) and an actual accepting impaired class is required unless all
classes are unimpaired. As amended, section 1129(a)(10) also facilitates
negotiation and settlement.
C. SECTION 1129(b)(2)(A)
This subsection clarifies the meaning of the "fair and equitable" re-
quirements in respect to secured claims. In particular, section 1129(b)(2)(A)
sets out three alternatives for providing "fair and equitable" treatment to
6'5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 6, 1129.0314]Hd] and 1129.02[10]; Broude, supra note 1,
at 450.
66Broude, supra note 1, at 450.
67Id.
68Id.
697 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 1407-08.
86 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 60
classes of secured creditors under a cramdown. Before addressing these
three alternatives, however, a few more general comments are necessary.
First of all, as CBPG claims, section 1129(b)(2) states that the "fair and
equitable" condition "includes the following requirements." 70 Section 102(3)
states that "includes" is "not limiting." CBPG argues that "in theory other
methods might satisfy the condition, although it is hard to conceive of an
alternative provision in view of the fact that the third requirement, the 'in-
dubitable equivalent' seems all encompassing." 71 As will be discussed later in
this article, such an expansive reading of the "indubitable equivalent" stan-
dard in clause (iii) is rejected, especially in light of the legislative history of
that clause at 124 Cong. Rec. H. 11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,421 (Oct. 6,
1978). At the other extreme is Coogan who reads section 1129(b)(2)(A)
very restrictively and is troubled by the possibility of a case arising under a
cramdown that is not covered by this section. 72 The weakness with
Coogan's argument is that he fails to give enough weight to the Code defini-
tion of the word "includes." Given section 102(3), the three clauses in sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A) are not meant to be all encompassing. Other criteria
might well fulfill the "fair and equitable" requirements without necessarily
fulfilling the "indubitable equivalent" standard. If the situation arises which
troubles Coogan, a court could draw up an alternative "fair and equitable"
requirement tailored to that particular situation.
The legislative history of this section does not resolve this confusion
though it tends to support the view that the three clauses in section
1129(b)(2)(A) were not meant to be all inclusive. For instance, the Congres-
sional Record states that:
Although many of the factors interpreting 'fair and
equitable' are specified in paragraph (2), others, which were
explicated in the description of section 1129(b) in the House
report were omitted from the House amendment to avoid
statutory complexity and because they would undoubtedly
be found by a court to be fundamental to 'fair and equitable'
treatment of a dissenting class.73
The example included in the Congressional Record to support this claim is
that, although not mentioned in section 1129(b)(2)(A), a "dissenting class
should be assured that no senior class receives more than 100 percent of the
7°6 COLLIER BANKR. PRACTICE Gumrn, supra note 47, '191.05.
71Id.
72Coogan, supra note 1, at 357ff.
71124 CoNG. REc. H. 11,104 (Sept. 29, 1978); S. 17,420 (Oct. 6, 1978).
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amount of its claims." 74 Such a factor would not fulfill the "indubitable
equivalent" requirement standard, but would be a "fair and equitable" re-
quirement. 75
D. CLAUSE (i)
Clause (i)(I) permits cramdown if the dissenting class of secured
creditors retains its liens securing its claims whether or not the debtor re-
tains the collateral or transfers it to another entity. A secured creditor's
liens secure the allowed secured claims to the amount as determined in sec-
tion 506, unless the class takes the section 1111(b) election. Under section
506(a) a claim is secured to the value of the collateral. In the absence of the
section 1111(b) election an undersecured claim is separated into two
parts-a secured claim to the extent of the value of the collateral and an
unsecured claim for the deficiency.
Each holder of such claims must be guaranteed an income stream of
"deferred cash payments." Taken together, these "deferred cash payments"
and lien retention requirements lead to the conclusion that, "The Code ex-
pressly provides that, in order to cramdown a plan on dissenting secured
creditors, any new paper must be in the nature of an indebtedness, not an
equity interest,"76 and that this paper must be secured. Each holder must
receive payments, as specified in the clause (i)(l):
(1)"totalling at least the allowed amount of such claim" and
(2)"of a value, as of the effective date of the plan," of an
amount which is "at least the value" of the secured
holder's interest in the collateral.
To put it simply, the total amount of the payments must equal at least the
allowed amount of the claim and the present value of such payments must
equal at least the value of the collateral.
The meaning of the phrase "allowed amount of such claim(s)" in clauses
(i)(1) and (1I) will depend on whether section 1111(b) is applicable to a class
of dissenting secured creditors. The relationship between sections 1129(b)
and 1111(b), which is one of the most complex and important of all of the
issues affecting the cramdown, lies outside the scope of this article. Never-
74M., which states that the deletion of this requirement "is intended to be one of style and not one of
substance."
73See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuprcy, supra note 6, 1129.03[4][a]. It suggests that a plan that satisfies
the requirements set forth in section 1129(b)(2)(A) may or may not be "fair and equitable" since other
"fair and equitable" requirements outside section 1129(b)(2)(A) may not have been met.
76Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations in Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, 50
U. Cm. L. Raz. 430,445 (1983). Countryman rejects this view in favor of the position that stock may be
issued under the "indubitable equivalent" standard.
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theless, to understand how the cramdown works, it is important to
appreciate at least the rudiments of the interaction between these two sec-
tions. Basically, section 1111(b) offers a secured creditor the option of hav-
ing its claim secured to the full value of the claim, rather than secured to the
value of the collateral and unsecured for the deficiency under section
506(a). 77 Although there are many reasons why a secured creditor would
decide whether or not to use the section 1111(b) option, it is enough to
know that a creditor will opt not to have the entire claim treated as secured
if: "the present value of what is received on the secured claim plus the pres-
ent value of the property it may be entitled to on the unsecured claim, is
greater than the prospective payments it may receive if the full amount of
the claim is treated as secured."' 8
E. CLAUSE (ii)
This clause holds that if the plan provides for the sale of any property of
the estate subject to a secured creditor's liens that secure allowed secured
claims, the creditor, in accordance with section 363(k), if he purchases such
property, "may offset such claim[sJ against the purchase price of such pro-
perty." The Congressional Record for section 363 states that this provision:
indicates that a secured creditor may bid in the full amount
of the creditor's allowed claim, including the secured por-
tion and any unsecured portion thereof in the event the
creditor is undersecured, with respect to property that is
subject to a lien that secures the allowed claim of the sale of
the property.79
This interpretation assumes that section 363(k) entitles the secured
creditor to bid. Before the 1984 Amendments were enacted, Countryman
persuasively argued that as written, section 363(k) did not entitle secured
creditors to bid. With the addition of the 1984 Amendments, however,
secured creditors now definitely have the right to bid. In any case, in accor-
dance with the Congressional Record, the section 1111(b) option is not
available to secured creditors in respect to collateral that is being sold under
section 363, since under section 363(k), the secured creditor is permitted to
bid in the full amount of his allowed claims anyway.8 0
If the value of the collateral that is sold is less than the amount of the
secured creditor's claims or if the creditor chooses not to offset his claims
7124 CoNG. REc. H. 11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,421 (Oct. 6, 1978).
786 CoLLIrn BANKR. PR.ACTICE GUIDE, supra note 47, 91.06121.
79124 CoNG. REc. H. 11,093 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,409 (Oct. 6, 1978).80124 CONG. REc. H. 11,103-11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,420 (Oct. 6, 1978).
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against the purchase price of the property, his liens will "attach to the pro-
ceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause
(i) or (iii)" will be provided. Thus, if the liens do attach to the proceeds, the
secured creditor will be protected by receiving either a cash stream under
clause (i)(11) or the "indubitable equivalent" under clause (iii).
F. CrAusE (iii)
A plan may also be confirmed notwithstanding the rejection of a class of
secured creditors, if the plan provides for the realization of the "indubitable
equivalent of such claims." This requirement of the "indubitable equivalent,"
which is also included in section 361(3) in regard to adequate protection, is
taken from Learned Hand's opinion in In re Murel Holding Corp.8x That case
held that a secured creditor should not be deprived of his security interest
"unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence."82
Clause (iii)'s broad scope and generality may be either advantageous or
disadvantageous depending on one's jurisprudential outlook- advantageous
in that it offers a flexible "fair and equitable" standard and makes it more
probable for the cramdown to work, or disadvantageous in that "its use in
the adequate protection area is fraught with the dangers of ambiguity and
imprecision."8 3 The legislative history does not prove very helpful in defin-
ing the scope of the "indubitable equivalent" requirement. It does say that
"abandonment of the collateral to the creditor would clearly satisfy in-
dubitable equivalence, as would a lien on similar collateral" and points out
that "unsecured notes as to the secured claim or equity securities of the
debtor would not be the indubitable equivalent."84
In conjunction with clause (i)(I) this language in the legislative history
would authorize secured notes as the "indubitable equivalent." As men-
tioned earlier, Countryman is troubled by the legislative history's rejection
of equity securities as the "indubitable equivalent" and sees no valid reason
for taking such a position. The arguments in favor of rejecting Countryman's
position will be discussed later in this article in the section about enterprise
valuation and the valuation of securities. To date, the issue has not been
tested in court, most likely because it has yet to occur. Only rarely will a
debtor attempt to compel a secured creditor to accept equity securities. In
small chapter 11 or chapter 13 cases, usually involving only one or two
secured creditors protected up to the value of their collateral, there will
8175 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). &e 124 CONG. Rac. H 11, 104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,421 (Oct. 6,
1978).
821d. at 942.
836 Cozu BANKEL. PRACTICE Gum;, supra note 47, 91.0512].
84124 CONG. Ric. H. 11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,421 (Oct. 6, 1978).
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seldom be a need for the issuance of equity securities. And in large corporate
reorganizations, involving hundreds or thousands of secured bondholders,
the plan will most likely fail unless the debtor can convince the bondholders
or their representative to agree to the plan and accept equity securities. As
will be discussed later, the issue of whether secured creditors should have
the final say about their acceptance of equity securities is closely tied to the
issue of whether secured creditors should be granted extra negotiating
leverage to protect their secured position.
The Congressional Record also states that "present cash payments less
than the secured claim would not satisfy the 'indubitable equivalent' stan-
dard because the creditor is deprived of an opportunity to gain from a future
increase in value of the collateral.""5 Given clause (i)(ll), it is evident that
cash payments less than the secured claim would not suffice, but the Con-
gressional Record's explanation is troublesome. Recall that clause (i)(ll) held
that the present value of the payments is to be determined as of the effective
date of the plan. Although the Congressional Record seems to be claiming
that the secured creditor should share in the appreciation of the collateral,
this may only be true up to the effective date of the plan, except in those
cases in which the secured creditor makes the section 1111(b) election or
other cases in which the plan is modified under section 1127(b). Section
1127(b) holds that modifications are limited to those instances in which the
"circumstances warrant such modification" and in which modifications are
proposed by either the proponent of a plan or the reorganized debtor. Since
the debtor will almost never want to pay a secured creditor more money, in
practice, a secured creditor's ability to modify a plan will be limited to the
cases in which that secured creditor is the proponent of the plan. Therefore,
unless the secured creditor makes the section 1111(b) option, he will most
likely share in the appreciation of the collateral only up to the effective date
of the plan. If he does elect the section 1111 (b) option, even then he will not
benefit fully from the increase in the value of the collateral, because the pres-
ent value of his cash payments will have been determined as of the effective
date of the plan and may only be changed if a modification is permitted.
The legislative history of "indubitable equivalence" is far from com-
prehensive though it does suggest that this standard is not all inclusive. The
result is that the uncertainty over the proper application of the 'indubitable
equivalent' requirement and the possibility of frequent disagreements over
whether or not a substitution of collateral is "similar," "can easily lead to ex-
tended litigation which may have the effect of attempting to coerce a
secured creditor into accepting less than its entitlement."8 6 One issue which
83d
.
866 COLUP.R BANKR. PFACTICE GuiDE, supra note 47, 191.05[2].
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has been litigated is that a debtor cannot use the "indubitable equivalent"
standard to bypass the requirements of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(Il).7
CBPG argues that if a secured creditor finds the debtor's proposal of
"similar" collateral to be unacceptable, he should argue:
(1) that the replacement collateral tendered as the indubi-
table equivalent is not, as a matter of law, the complete
equivalent, because of various differences in the nature
and quality of the two types of security; and
(2) that the value of the proposed substitution is less than
the original, and therefore does not satisfy the fair and
equitable requirement.88
Consider these issues in relation to the following hypothetical which is
drawn from the facts of In re Mansfield Tire and Rubber Co.:89
A secured creditor objects to the confirmation plan offered
by the debtor. He has cash collateral of $1,000,000 securing
his debt. The debtor attempts to cramdown the plan under
clause (iii) by claiming that a replacement lien on a vacant
tire plant is the 'indubitable equivalent' for the cash col-
lateral. What result?
In Mansfield, the court held that the replacement lien was adequate protec-
tion under section 361. Such a ruling might be justified under either the
replacement lien test of section 361(2) or the "indubitable equivalent" test of
section 361(3). But, as CBPG points out, in a cramdown, "the 'similar' col-
lateral reference in the legislative history may preclude that type of out-
come."90 If so, the result will be that the "indubitable equivalent" phrases in
sections 361(3) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) will be interpreted differently.
Such a result is not as surprising as it may first appear, since section 361
includes a separate "replacement lien" authorization unlike section 1129(b)(2)(A)
which does not. The legislative history of section 361 states that the "in,
dubitable equivalent" standard in section 361(3) is to be used "if none of the
other methods would accomplish the desired result."91 Under this inter-
pretation, a replacement lien on dissimilar collateral might be prohibited
under the "indubitable equivalent" standard in both section 361(3) and sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) but for different reasons. The legislative history also
includes within the scope of the "indubitable equivalent" standard of section
361(3) certain protection that is within the scope of section
871n re Griffiths, 27 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. D.K.C. 1983).
886 Cotuim BANKR. PRACTICE GumE, supra note 47, 91.05[2].
89Case No. 679-01239 (N.D. Ohio, November 26, 1979) (Williams, BJ.) cited in id.
906 Coung BAw.R. PRAcricE GUME, supra note 47, 91.05[2].
9'H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 340.
1986)
92 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 60
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) rather than within the scope of the "indubitable
equivalent" standard of clause (iii). 9 2 This also leads to two different inter-
pretations of the "indubitable equivalent" language. Finally, one might argue
that section 361(3) could be used to authorize a replacement lien, in-
dependently of a "similar collateral" requirement. Under this interpretation a
replacement lien could be authorized under section 361(3) but not under sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). Whether or not one accepts some or none of these
arguments in favor of interpreting the "indubitable equivalent" standards in
these sections differently, there is no denying that as the "indubitable
equivalent" standard exists today, a Mansfield type situation under the
cramdown would almost surely cause litigation.
G. SECURED CREDITOR'S ALTERNATIVES
The cramdown under section 1129(b)(2)(A) may only be invoked if
a class of secured creditors chooses to reject a plan. Having worked through
the "fair and equitable" requirements contained in the three clauses of sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A), the question arises about what a class of secured credi-
tors should consider in determining whether or not it should reject a pro-
posed plan.93 CBPG offers six factors for the secured creditor to consider
when making such a decision:
(1) the extent of impairment of its claim;
(2) the value of the distribution proposed in the plan;
(3) the likelihood that forcing application of the fair and
equitable provision of section 1129(b) will increase its
ultimate return;
(4) the existence of other assets beyond the collateral and
the extent to which it may reasonably be expected that
the collateral will increase in value so as to base a deci-
sion upon making the section 1111(b) election;
(5) the risks involved in a valuation or fair and equitable
hearing significantly delaying confirmation; and
(6) whether the debtor can sustain its burden of proof at
such a hearing.94
There are no fixed rules for the secured creditor to follow. The individual
circumstances of each case, including the specific nature of the collateral in
question, will be important factors. 9- Many commentators believe,
92d., which specifies that "permitting a secured creditor to bid in his claim at the sale of the property
and to offset the claim against the price bid in" is within the scope of section 361(3).
936 COLLIER BANKR. PRACTICE GumE, supra note 47, 91.07.
941d.
951d.
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however, that the risks involved in valuation are often the most important.96
After rejecting a plan, a secured creditor might believe that it is not be-
ing given "fair and equitable" treatment under section 1129(b)(2)(A). If this
happens, the secured creditor should reconsider the six factors listed above.
In addition, it should at that time:
(1) seek a determination of the secured status of its claim
and the amount, if any, of its unsecured claim under sec-
tion 506(a); and
(2) to the extent that the class of secured claims contends
that it is not being provided with the statutorily man-
dated fair and equitable treatment, . .. file objections to
confirmation.... It is suggested that such an objection
specify the nature of the alleged noncompliance with
the requirements of section 1129(b)(2)(A).97
After rejecting a plan, the secured creditor next faces the many risks in-
volved in valuation, to be discussed in part M.
PART III.
A. VALUATION UNDER SECTION 1129(b)(2)(A)
As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the development of the pre-
Code case law and legislative history, though the terminology about valua-
tion for the purposes of reorganization often includes somewhat scientific
and mathematical formulae, there is no avoiding the often heated environ-
ment that increases the potential of the importance of emotional, irrational
factors in the decisions. "To paraphrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
participants may make their decision on intuitions deeper than logic."98
Coogan aptly refers to the following words of Holmes, which though spoken
in regard to a different issue, are quite applicable to accepting or rejecting a
plan: 'The action does not appear to have been arbitrary except in the sense
in which many honest and sensible judgments are so. They express an intui-
tion of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and
tangled impressions: impressions which may lie beneath consciousness
without losing their worth."99 Likewise, as Coogan also points out, in a re-
cent reorganization case in California, the judge stated that "in a highly
charged case, scarcely a single issue was settled on the basis of business
96Sec Broude, Coogan, Klee, and Pachulski, supra note 1.
976 Cowas. BANKR. PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 47, 91.02[3].
98Coogan, svpra note 1, at 349.
99Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907), cited in id., n.179 at 349.
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judgment."100 The aim of this approach to the forum in which valuation oc-
curs is to show:
that it is wise to conduct negotiations aimed at producing a
plan which will receive consent from the statutory majority
of each class... Perhaps the principal use of section
1129(b) will be a bargaining club which dissidents on the
one hand or the plan proponents on the other may employ
to reach agreement rather than face the trials and tribula-
tions of a section 1129(b) proceeding.101
For instance, one of the main incentives for avoiding a cramdown of a
no-stock plan involves risks associated with enterprise valuation. Under the
confirmation of a plan pursuant to section 1129(a), in which there is no "fair
and equitable" requirement, a valuation of the business of the debtor is not
contemplated.102 In comparison, section 1129(b), with its "fair and
equitable" requirements, requires such a valuation in many cases. 0 3 To
avoid the highly charged environment that leads to a cramdown is therefore
in all the parties' best interests.
The "fair and equitable" requirements are meant to entitle "each creditor
to the equitable equivalent of his claim against the debtor."'0 4 Therefore,
valuation is crucial. It "enters into fairness and equity because the measure
of rights, under the fair and equitable standard, looks to collectibility as well
as allowability."'0 5
The method of valuation to be used depends on the purposes for the
valuation. Under section 1129(b)(2)(A) there are three main types of valua-
tion which are needed for different sections of the cramdown:
(1) Present value analysis and discount rate valuation.
(2) Enterprise valuation and the valuation of securities.
(3) Collateral valuation.
Types (1) and (3) will almost always be needed for a cramdown on secured
creditors, unlike type (2) which is more frequentlyused in connection with a
cramdown on unsecured creditors and equity holders. However, if Coun-
tryman is correct and secured creditors may be compelled to accept equity
securities, then type (2) will also frequently be utilized in cramdowns on
secured creditors. Also, for the purposes of determining the "feasibility" of a
10OCoogan, supra note 1, n.179 at 349, discussing In re Nite Lite Inns, 6 CoLnsR BeAit. CAS. 2d
(MB) 107, 110 (1982).
'°'Coogan, supra note 1, at 362.
12H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 414.
1031d.
1°4Bkr. L. Ed. § 42:85 (1979).
1oSId.
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plan, a type (2) enterprise valuation might be necessary for a cramdown on
secured creditors.106
1. Present value analysis and discount rate valuation
Under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(ll), the court must make a present value
analysis to determine the present value of deferred cash payments that each
secured creditor must receive as part of his future cash stream. A discus-
sion of this process for discounting future payments to present value lies
beyond the scope of this article. However, in order to understand section
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(11), it is first necessary to understand the rudiments of this
process:
What the Code does not define when it uses the term
'present value', and hence what the court may be required
to determine, is the appropriate rate of interest which will
serve as the standard by which the court must compare the
difference, if any, between the current (present) value of
deferred cash payments and the value of the collateral,
under the terms of the proposed cramdown provision.
What is the appropriate discount rate? It is suggested
that such rate is equivalent to the rate of interest that
would be paid on a similar obligation by the debtor con-
sidering a market rate of interest that reflects current supply
and demand of money, the nature of the lender, the dura-
tion of the loan, the market's perception of the risk under
the circumstances, and the nature of the collateral.107
There is often much disagreement between the parties about setting the dis-
count rate, with the debtor arguing for a lower rate and the creditor for a
higher one.108 One of the results of this disagreement is that the court often
1060n the topic of feasibility, see Landmark at Plaza Park, 7 Bankr. 653, 659 (D. NJ. 1980), in which
the court cites six criteria from 5 COLUER ON BiAKRupTcy., supra note 6, 1129.02[11] for determining
feasibility:
1. the adequacy of the capital structure;
2. the earning power of the business;
3. economic conditions;
4. the ability of management;
5. the probability of the continuation of the same management; and
6. any other related matters which determine the prospects of a sufficiently suc-
cessful operation to enable performance of the provisions of the plan.
1076 COLLIER BANKR. PRACTICE GuroE, supra note 47, 91.05[l].
"08Sce In re Sullivan, 26 Bankr. 677 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), which held that when the prime interest rate is
greater than 16%, a plan which proposes to pay interest on a fully secured claim at a rate of 9.5% is not
"fair and equitable" under section 1129(b)(2)(A).
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steps into the fray to exercise its discretion and picks the discount rate
which it deems to be appropriate.
2. Enterprise valuation and the valuation of securities
Enterprise valuation is closely tied to the valuation of equity securities.
Frequently, as part of a reorganization plan, the debtor issues equity
securities in the reorganized company to unsecured creditors and equity
holders. If secured creditors consent, they too may receive equity securities.
In such reorganizations, a cramdown may still be needed under section
1129(b)(1)(B) in regard to classes of unsecured creditors or under section
1129(b)(2)(C) in regard to equity interests because:
(1) If a cram down is used against a class of claims or in-
terests, the court may have to determine whether
securities issued under the plan have a value equal to
the amount of the claims of the non-assenting class of
creditors or the value of the interests of the non-
assenting class of equity interests.
(2) In the alternative, if the proponent of a plan attempts to
cram down a class of claims or interests by terminating
the rights of the class or classes junior to the dissenting
class, the court will have to value the securities issued
under the plan in order to determine that no class senior
to the dissenting class will receive more than full pay-
ment under the plan.109
Are similar valuations of equity securities and the concomitant valuation of
the enterprise necessary if a cramdown is used against a class of secured
creditors? Countryman's position to the contrary, the answer is, "No,"
because the author believes secured creditors cannot be compelled to accept
equity securities. Unlike secured notes which protect the secured creditor's
secured position, equity securities expose secured creditors to risks the
drafters of the Code did not intend secured creditors to bear without so
choosing. That secured creditors were to be treated differently than other
creditors is explicit in light of the legislative history that claims that
"[uinsecured notes as to the secured, claim or equity securities of the debtor
would not be the indubitable equivalent,"'1 and therefore may only be ac-
1095 COLLIER ON BANKER., supra note 6, 11129.0314}[f).
110124 CONG. Rac. H. 11,104 (Sept. 28, 1978); S. 17,421 (Oct. 6, 1978); Pachulski, supra note 1, at
949-50; Blum, supra note 76, at 445, agree. See In re N.E. Parks Lumber Co., Inc., 19 Bankr. 285 (1982),
in which the court recognized the special status of secured creditors and issued income bonds rather than
equity securities to better preserve the secured position of the secured creditor to the extent possible.
However, though the court did not directly address the issue, its opinion seems to support Countryman's
contention that a court may compel secured creditors to accept equity securities. Countryman is troubled
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cepted by secured creditors if they so choose.
Isaac Pachulski demonstrates that the prohibition on compelling secured
creditors to accept equity securities is further supported by comparing the
secured creditor cramdown sections, on the one hand, with the unsecured
creditor and equity holder cramdown sections on the other,"' Section
1129(b)(2)(B)(i), in respect to unsecured claims, states that: "each holder of
a claim of such class receive or retain on account of such claim property of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of
such claim." (emphasis added) Section 1129(b)(2)(C)(i), in respect to equity
interests, similarly provides that each holder receive or retain "property."
The legislative history defined property as including "both tangible and in,
tangible property, such as a security of the debtor or a successor to the debt,
or under a reorganization plan."112 An earlier draft of section 1129(b)(2)(A)
discussed in the legislative history provided that in respect to secured in
terests, each holder receive "property."13 However, in stark contrast to this
earlier draft of section 1129(b)(2)(A), which would have permitted the com-
pelled acceptance of equity securities, and to the present sections
1129(b)(2)(B) and (C), which do permit the compelled acceptance of equity
securities, present section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I), in respect to secured claims,
does not. Rather this section provides that each holder receive "deferred
cash payments." The alternative under 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) is that a secured
creditor may receive the "indubitable equivalent" but, as mentioned earlier,
the legislative history of this clause argues against compelling the acceptance
of equity securities.114 The same result is reached under clause (ii) which re-
quires treatment in accordance with either clause (i) or (iii).
Sections 1129(b)(2)(B) and (C) deserve some clarification. They do not
state that unsecured creditors or equity interests must be paid in property,
but rather if they are to be paid, are to be paid in property. If, in a cramdown
on secured creditors, secured debt exceeds the value of the enterprise,
secured creditors will get paid in full before unsecured creditors or
by reading clause (iii) as prohibiting the compelling of a secured creditor to accept equity securities,
because such a prohibition would make the cramdown of a Case allstock deal impossible and because the
issuance of equity securities eases the financial burdens on the debtor and thereby increases the potential
for feasibility. The author is not as troubled by these results. In effect, the Code prohibition on compell-
ing a secured creditor to accept equity securities increases the bargaining position of secured creditors.
Thus, the Case all-stock deal will most likely be confirmed, but only after the secured creditors negotiate
a "step-up" as compensation for their increased risk. See H.R. RiE., supra note 25, at 414. Also, the fact
that the issuance of equity securities will improve the financial condition of the debtor will serve as an in-
centive to secured creditors to accept equity securities. Therefore the results that trouble Countryman
will rarely, if ever, come about.
IlPachulski, supra note 1, at 949-50.
112H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 413.
113 d
"'4See supra note 84.
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shareholders will receive anything. Likewise, if unsecured and secured debt
exceeds the value of the enterprise, the shareholders will receive nothing:
Thus, a class of shareholders whose equity interests are
eliminated may not prevent senior creditors from giving up
value to an intermediate class of junior unsecured creditors
as long as no class is provided for more than in full.
However, in order to determine whether junior creditors
are provided for more than in full, it will be necessary to
value the consideration received under the plan. If the con-
sideration received is stock of the debtor, then the business
will need to be valued."1
Notice the competing negotiating threats at work here-the secured and
unsecured creditors can threaten to give the shareholders nothing while the
shareholders can complain that unsecured creditors are receiving more than
payment in full and threaten to seek a valuation of the debtor:
The threat of valuation gives negotiating leverage to the
class of ownership interests. Since a valuation of the
business must be made if the shareholders dissent, often
seniors will give up value to shareholders to obtain their
consent to the plan. If the shareholders consent a costly
valuation may be avoided.116
In this example, enterprise valuation may be used by the shareholders as a
weapon to convince the secured and unsecured creditors to avoid invoking
the cramdown. In other instances, if the unsecured creditors receive nothing
they might claim that the secured creditors were provided for more than in
full, and similarly seek an enterprise valuation.
A few words are also in order to explain the repercussions on the then
necessary enterprise valuation and the valuation of securities if Coun-
tryman's view is accepted and secured creditors may be compelled to accept
equity securities under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). First of all, full compensa-
tion for secured claims might well include a "step-up" as compensation:
for their loss of priority and the increased risk that they are
subjected to by that loss of priority. The legislative history
suggests that compensation for this loss of priority should
be provided by assigning a lower value to the securities
given to the senior creditors than to the comparable
"'Klee, supra note 1, at 144-145.
1161d.; Brudney and Chirelstein, supra note 33, at 125, agree. They write that seniors will make con-
cessions to juniors, if the juniors forego "their nuisance power to delay the reorganization."
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securities given to junior creditors who have not lost a
priority position ....
The legislative history suggests that Congress saw no
inconsistency between the requirement that no class
receive more than 100 percent of its claims and the require-
ment that senior classes be compensated for a loss of priori-
ty. Perhaps one way to resolve any inconsistency is to
recognize that the components of a claim include not only
the amount of the claim, but also the quality of the claim,
reflected in its priority, and the corresponding effect on the
likelihood of repayment. 117
A second issue involves the valuing of the securities to be issued. This
valuation, as mentioned earlier, is closely linked to the reorganization or
enterprise valuation.1 8 As under Chapter X, the value of the securities:
would be the difference between the reorganization value of
the enterprise as a whole and the indebtedness with which
the reorganized company would emerge under the plan. For
example, if the value of the debtor on a 'going concern' basis
was found to be $11 million and the plan provided for the
debtor to emerge with indebtedness of $6 million, the equi-
ty securities to be issued under the plan would be valued at
$5 million.119
This is the value to be used even if the market value of the securities is dif-
ferent from the reorganization value computed in the above formula because,
"it [is] deemed appropriate to use the 'investment' value or 'intrinsic' value of
the securities, based on a 'going concern' valuation, rather than 'spot market
value' as the basis for valuation."120 On both of these issues agreement is not
unanimous and arguments have been made suggesting alternatives to step-
up compensation and supporting market valuation.121
Just because a cramdown of secured claims may not necessitate a valua-
tion of securities does not mean that it will also not necessitate an enter
prise valuation. Recall that DuBois held that an enterprise valuation is
necessary for determining questions of feasibility. In respect to secured
claims, the feasibility issues will be in respect to the cash stream under sec-
117Pachulski, supra note 1, at 945. See H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 414. Countryman wants the pro-
ponent of the plan to have negotiating leverage in the form of the step-up, while the author believes such
a negotiating weapon belongs in the hands of the secured creditors.
lsd, at 941-42.
119Id. at 942.
120d.
l21See Brudney and Chirelstein, supra note 33, at 136-41; Pachulski, supra note 1, n.96, at 945-46.
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tion 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(ll). A few words about enterprise valuation are
therefore in order.
The procedure for valuing the enterprise harks back to the formula used
in DuBois, because as Pachulski states:
Congress was aware of the test applied under Chapter X
and did not suggest that a different standard would be used
in applying the fair and equitable test under Chapter 11. In
fact, it was stated that the application of the rule would re-
quire 'a full valuation of the debtor as the absolute priority
rule does under current law.'122
As mentioned earlier, the DuBois formula involves: "Projecting the enter
prise's income stream and then determining a discounted present value for
that income stream by multiplying the average annual projected income by a
multiplier based on an appropriate capitalization rate."123 This two-step pro-
cess involves making separate valuations for the income stream and for the
discount rate. In regard to the latter:
This discounting is accomplished by multiplying the average
annual projected earnings by a multiplier that is the inverse
of the capitalization rate. For example, if the capitalization
rate (that is, the expected rate of return) were 20 percent,
the multiplier would be 5, if the capitalization rate were 10
percent, the multiplier would be 10. Thus, the higher the
expected rate of return required by investors, the lower the
multiplier and thus the lower the going concern value of the
debtor.124
As Pachulski points out, this procedure is not cast in stone, and the go-
ing enterprise valuation procedure is not necessarily the best method for
calculating the value of all parts of the enterprise. 25 He offers some ex-
amples:
[N]onproductive assets, such as excess working capital or
cash, excess or abandoned plants, other nonproductive real
or personal property held for liquidation, and generally any
assets not necessary to produce the anticipated income
stream, would be valued separately and their value added
to the going concern value in determining reorganization
value. 126
l22Pachulski, supra note 1, n.149 at 963, citing H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 223-24.
'23Pachulski, supra note 1, at 940.
1241d.
1231d. at 941.
126d.
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If additional working capital was needed to enable the reorganized debtor
"to achieve the projected income stream, that amount [would be] deducted
from reorganization value."127 And finally, if the liquidation value happened
to be higher than the going concern value, then the liquidation value would
be used, because then there would be a liquidation plan.128
It is also important to realize that even if the feasibility issue does not
arise in respect to the cash stream for secured claims, as mentioned earlier,
an enterprise valuation will be necessary independently of the secured
creditors, if equity securities are issued to unsecured creditors or equity in-
terest holders.
3. Valuation of collateral
The valuation of collateral is one of the most important issues involved
in the cramdown on secured creditors. Keep in mind that section 506(a)
holds that value, "shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation
and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any bearing on such disposition or use on a plan affecting such
creditor's interest."
It should be self-evident that serious disagreements about the valuation
of collateral will usually arise in situations in which a secured creditor is
undersecured for, under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(ll), the present value of
the cash stream must be at least equal to the value of the collateral, and not
to the value of the claim. In such a situation, another way for the secured
creditor to get more money, other than by seeking a higher valuation of the
collateral, is to seek an adjustment in the discount rate.
During a reorganization, collateral may be valued at different times for
different purposes, e.g., a section 362(d) valuation for determining adequate
protection, a section 1129(a)(7) best interest of creditor's test to protect
dissident members within a class, and a section 1129(b) collateral valuation
to protect dissenting secured classes. These different valuations within any
one reorganization raise important ethical issues for the attorneys who
represent the debtor or secured creditors. For instance, during the early
stages of a reorganization, a secured creditor might try to vacate the section
362(d)(2) automatic stay on enforcement of liens against property of the
debtor by arguing under that section that, "The debtor does not have any
equity in such property. My claim is worth $100,000, while the value of the
collateral is only $50,000."129 For the purpose of escaping from the stay, it is
in the secured creditor's best interest to argue for as low a value as possible
127Jd.
12Pn.
1293 COLLIER ON BANKR. PRACTicE GUMDE, supra note 47, 152.05.
102 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 60
for the collateral. The debtor, on the other hand, will seek to argue for as
high a value as possible.
At the time of a collateral valuation for the purpose of a best interest of
creditor's test under section 1129(a)(7), the tables will turn-the secured
creditor will argue for a higher liquidation value and the debtor for a lower
one. For the purpose of collateral valuation under a cramdown on secured
creditors, the secured creditor will argue for an even higher value, because
the greater the value of the collateral, the higher will be the present value of
the cash stream or value of the "indubitable equivalent."
Unless a wild fluctuation in the value of the collateral has occurred
"(such as might occur with respect to securities, seasonal inventory, com-
modities, etc.) or unless a different standard of valuation is applicable, the
secured creditor might find itself taking truly inconsistent positions not-
withstanding the legislative intent." (emphasis in original)130 Other situa-
tions that would justify submitting in good faith different valuations of
collateral include cases in which at first there are dim prospects of
reorganization (which would justify a secured creditor arguing in favor of li-
quidation value for section 362 purposes) but later there are high hopes for a
plan being confirmed (which would justify a secured creditor arguing in
favor of a high going concern value for "fair and equitable" purposes). In the
absence of one of these applicable excuses, however, the submission of dif-
ferent valuations of collateral should be seriously questioned by the court.
It must also be remembered that the court will often step in to assist
with valuation. As CBPG demonstrates, although the issue of collateral
valuation is one best suited to a case by case approach, "with due considera-
tion given to the facts and interests involved at the particular time," there is
a tendency for the courts to use "the standards of commercial reasonable-
ness adopted from the Uniform Commercial Code."131 It points out that the
courts are moving in the direction in which: "only in the rarest of cir-
cumstances where other methods of disposition are precluded, should the
property be valued at forced sale standards; generally, value of collateral
should be determined by what could be obtained from the most commercial-
ly reasonable disposition under the circumstances."132
For purposes of a cramdown, in the case of income-producing collateral,
Pachulski offers a few arguments in favor of "going concern value" (which he
views as the most commercially reasonable) over liquidation value:
(1) The 'fair and equitable' test would appear to add little
to section 1129(a)(7) if the collateral were valued on
30 d. (emphasis in original).
131d
1321d.
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the basis of liquidation value when applying the 'fair
and equitable' test.
(2) ... It would appear to be inconsistent with th[e] judg-
ment [that junior classes should not participate in going
concern value when senior classes are not being paid in
fullj to limit the inadequately collaterized secured credi-
tor to a distribution based on the liquidation value of
the collateral with the result that junior classes would
be permitted to share in the going concern value of the
collateral, even though the secured creditor was not
receiving the full amount of its claim.
(3) ... There is authority under the old Bankruptcy Act
that suggests that, when the debtor is attempting to
'cram down' a secured creditor whose collateral consists
of an income-producing asset by paying the creditor the
value of its interests in the collateral, the collateral
should be valued on a 'going concern' basis.133
Some collateral "is not, of itself, income-producing, but may have greater
value as part of a going concern rather than [in] liquidation."' 34 Such col-
lateral, like inventory and accounts receivable, requires slightly different
treatment. Here, Pachulski supports going concern value for accounts
receivable of that "face value, subject to an appropriate bad debt reserve"
and cost of collection; and for inventory, "that price that would be obtained
from customers in the ordinary course of business."' 35 For non-income pro-
ducing collateral, such as machinery or real estate, which "unlike inventory
and acounts, may not be sold or realized upon in the near future as part of
the debtor's business operations," he suggests that the standard of valuation
should be the fair market value less costs incurred in selling the property. 36
It must also be kept in mind that even in cases where the parties agree
on the method of valuation to be used, they might strongly disagree about
the actual results that the agreed upon method produces. In In re Rodgers
Development Corp. 7 for instance the expert appraiser of the debtor deter-
mined the fair market value of a piece of property to be $801,000 and the ex-
"3Pachulski, supra note 1, at 958-60, though he does cite some authority, including In re Jumpers
Equities, Ltd., 4 BANrmK CT. DEc. (CRR) 1269 (D. Md. 1978), at 960, for the view that the dissenting
secured creditor need not receive the full going concern valve, but rather that the" 'going concern bonus'
must be allocated on the basis of an 'equitable apportionmene among all the parties." 4 BA~NKR. CT. DEc.
(CRR) at 1270.
134Pachulski, supra note 1, at 961.
3SId. at 961-62.
136Id. at 962.
1372 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
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pert appraiser of the secured creditor determined it to be $704,000 (for the
purposes of determining adequate protection under section 362(d)(2)). Both
appraisers used accepted real estate fair market valuations-the court re-
jected both figures in favor of a "reasonable" value of $750,000.
Finally, the secured creditor faces yet another risk in the valuation of
collateral. Notice that the subsections of section 1129(b)(2) refer to
"claim(s)" and not to "creditor(s)." As previously mentioned, in accordance
with section 506(a), a secured claim is secured only to the value of the col-
lateral and is unsecured for the deficiency. Only the secured claim may be
crammed down under section 1129(b)(2)(A), while the deficiency (if it
exists) may only be crammed down under section 1129(b)(2)(B). Therefore,
if a valuation of collateral for the purposes of a cramdown on secured
creditors demonstrates that a secured creditor's claim is not completely
secured, that creditor will face the same risks and problems that other
unsecured creditors face.
B. CONCLUSION
The risks and uncertainties involved in a cramdown on secured
creditors are great. First, the cramdown provisions themselves cause much
confusion. For instance, conflicting interpretations of the "indubitable
equivalent" standard will lead to much litigation to determine what is
"similar" collateral and whether or not a court may compel secured creditors
to accept equity securities. Second, more ambiguity arises from the interac-
tion between the cramdown provisions and other related Code provisions.
Third, collateral valuation and the setting of a discount rate are inherently
risky to both the debtor and the secured creditors. Disagreement may arise
over the proper standards for valuing collateral or the method for determin-
ing the discount rate. Or, even if the debtor and secured creditors use the
same standards or methods, they nevertheless may generate different
results. These disputes in turn will expose the parties to the uncertainties
involved in the judicial determination of collateral valuation or the discount
rate. Fourth, if an enterprise valuation and valuation of securities are
necessary, greater uncertainties and complex valuation issues arise. Fifth, a
cramdown may cause delays that will make confirmation of a plan difficult, if
not impossible. Sixth, in large, complicated corporate reorganizations, the
imposition of a cramdown is more likely to lead to the liquidation of the
debtor than to the confirmation of a plan. Lastly, a cramdown will most like-
ly cause parties to become more intransigent and lead to protracted litigation
and adversity.
All of these risks and uncertainties may be avoided if the parties avert a
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cramdown. "The imposition of the fair and equitable standard and a
modified version of the absolute priority rule in [Cihapter 11 is thus de-
signed to bring the parties to the bargaining table in an attempt to avoid the
various risks," 138 and uncertainties described throughout this article. The
threat of a cramdown thus becomes an important factor encouraging settle-
ment. Granted, under certain circumstances, it might be to a party's advan-
tage to cramdown a plan, but in most chapter 11 cases, it will be in the best
interest of all the parties to reach a settlement and to consent to a plan
under section 1129(a), rather than to resort to a cramdown under section
1129(b).
ADDENDUM
The risks involved in the valuations needed under a cramdown and the
workings of the cramdown provisions themselves can all be better
understood by looking at a few problems. The following fact situation and
problems are partly borrowed and partly based on facts and problems of
Kenneth N. Klee. 139
FACTS
Assume that a creditor in 1978 loaned debtor $1,000,000, secured by a
mortgage on a parcel of real estate worth $1,050,000. The debtor is a real
estate developing company and this parcel of real estate is one of its prime
holdings. Over the next year, the real estate market in that part of the coun-
try collapses, forcing the debtor to seek protection from his creditors. On
November 1, 1979, the debtor files for reorganization under chapter 11.
Prospects for a successful reorganization look bleak and the secured creditor
seeks a valuation under section 362(d)(2) in an attempt to gain relief from
the automatic stay. In determining the value of the property, the court
upholds a liquidation value of $400,000, which is equal to the going concern
value in this depressed real estate market.
The prospects for a reorganization begin to pick up when three Fortune
500 companies decide to build their corporate headquarters on land owned
by the debtor. The debtor proposes a plan of reorganization, effective as of
January 1, 1980. Time is of the essence since the three Fortune 500 com-
panies will look elsewhere if the debtor does not make a deal within one
month. "IT]he plan proposes to pay the secured creditor a total of $600,000,
without interest, in four equal installments of $150,000, commencing one
year after the effective date of the plan. The mortgage will remain on the
I38Broude, supra note 1, at 454.
"3Klee, supra note 1, at 156ff.
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real estate to secure those payments."'140 The secured creditor, in a class by
himself, since he is the only holder of a mortgage on that particular parcel of
real estate, opposes the plan. The debtor invokes the cramdown under sec-
tion 1129(b)(2)(A) and asserts that the court should confirm the plan, not-
withstanding the dissent of the secured class, because under the plan that
class will receive "fair and equitable" treatment. Is that plan "fair and
equitable" with respect to the secured creditor?
First of all, for the purposes of the cramdown, the collateral must be
revalued. Given that the fair market value of the real estate has substantial-
ly increased in value and that this parcel is an integral part of any reorganiza-
tion plan, the going concern fair market value should be used. As of the ef-
fective date of the plan, the court finds the collateral to be worth $600,000.
CLAUSE (i)-PROBLEM 1
Clause (i)(I) is fulfilled since the mortgage will continue on the parcel of
real estate for $600,000 unless the secured creditor takes the section
1111(b) election. Clause (i)(11) requires that the total amount of cash
payments must at least equal the allowed amount of the claim. The secured
creditor's secured claim equals $600,000 and the plan provides for it to
receive four equal payments of $150,000. Since these four payments total
$600,000, this condition has been met.
But does the present value of the payments equal the value of the col-
lateral? The answer is, "No," because "since no interest is to be paid, the
present value of the four payments will be less than the $600,000 [the value
of the collateral] and the present-value test is not met."141
For the debtor to meet the "fair and equitable" standard for present
value, and make four equal payments, the following chart of interest rates
and payment amounts that all have present values of $600,000 proves
helpful:
Interest Rate Amount of Each Payment
10% $189,282
12% $197,541
13% $201,717
14% $205,923
16% $214,425
18% $223,043
14oId. at 156.
1411d. at 157.
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20% $231,773
22% $240,612
24% $249,555
26% $258,600
28% $267,741
30% $276,900
Notice that the interest (discount) rate chosen by the court greatly affects
the size of the annual payments that must be made. All of the above interest
rates and related payments would fulfill the present-value test and might be
chosen by the court as satisfactory.
SECTION 1111(b) OPTION-PROBLEM 2
If the secured creditor opted for application of section 1111(b), his
secured claim would be for $1,000,000 (the value of the debt) rather than
$600,000 (the value of the collateral). "Assume that the [debtor] proposes to
pay the secured creditor a total of $1,000,000, without interest, in four
equal annual installments of $250,000, commencing one year after the effec-
tive date of the plan, secured by the mortgage on real estate."142 As in the
previous example, the requirement in clause (i)(i) would be fulfilled as well
as to the total principal-amount requirement in clause (i)(LI). Here too, the
question is whether the present value of the payments equals the value of
the collateral, which is $600,000. The answer depends on the discount rate
chosen by the court. If the court chooses a rate of 25%, then the present
value of the payments is only $590,500 and confirmation will fail. If,
however, the court chooses a rate of 20%, the present value of the payments
will be $647,250, the "fair and equitable" standards will be met, and the plan
will be confirmed. 143 Notice that the difference between confirming and not
confirming a plan may be only a matter of a few percentage points in the
chosen interest rate. Also notice that if the 20% rate is chosen, "if the class
of equity ownership interests were to dissent, the plan would not be con-
firmed as the secured creditor would receive more than payment in full,"144
since the present value of the payments is greater than the value of the col-
lateral.
CLAUSE (ii)-PROBLEM 3
Assume that the plan proposes for the debtor to sell the parcel of real
estate for $600,000, free and clear of the secured creditor's mortgage, with
the mortgage attaching to the proceeds of the sale. Also assume that the
142d. at 158.
143ld.
'44d. at 159.
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debtor proposes the same plan as that offered in problem 1, of four equal
payments of $150,000. Under section 363(k), in accordance with the
legislative history of the Code and the 1984 Amendments, the secured
creditor will be entitled to bid both the secured and unsecured parts of his
claim and offset his entire claim against the purchase price. The secured
creditor would not be able to make the section 1111(b) option.
If the secured creditor either chooses not to offset his claims against the
purchase price, or rejects the plan, the sale would not change the result
reached in problem 1, and therefore the treatment would not comply with
the "fair and equitable" requirements and the plan would not be confirmed.
CLAUSE (iii)-PROBLEM 4
Suppose the debtor proposes to offer the secured creditor a replacement
lien on another prime piece of real estate with a market value of $600,000?
This would most likely satisfy the "indubitable equivalent" "similar" col-
lateral requirements. What about a replacement lien on a parcel of real
estate with a market value of $400,000? This would probably fail to meet
the "similar" requirement. What about a replacment lien on the debtor's of-
fice building? This would probably not satisfy the "similar" requirement.
What about unsecured notes in the reorganized company? These too would
fail to fulfill the "indubitable equivalent" requirement. What about secured
notes? These would satisfy the "indubitable equivalent" standard. Finally,
what about equity securities? The arguments go both ways, though the
author believes they would fail to fulfill the "indubitable equivalent" stan-
dard. Under all of these secenarios, given the ambiguity in the "indubitable
equivalent" requirement, litigation would probably be needed to determine
the result.
